Fraternité, Travail, Progrès?
Tall, fair, and handsome, Niger’s president, Mohamed Bazoum, delivered his speech during the opening session of the New Global Financial Pact Summit held June 22, 2023, in France.
He returned to his landlocked country, unbeknownst to him, to a life locked away in captivity.
On July 26, Mr Bazoum’s most senior military guard, General Abdourahamane Tchiani, turned on his principal, unseated him, and locked him up.
Mr Tchiani, together with his fellow coup plotters, has since ruled the Niger Republic to the admiration of his military cohorts in Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Mali.
A section of Niger’s population also interprets Tchiani’s military rule as opposite to France’s indirect rule of the country through democratically elected civilian proxies.
Yet, President Bazoum’s stunned colleagues all over the world insist Tchiani’s unilateral act was a travesty of the authority vested only in the people to remove or keep Bazoum in power at the general elections.
Mr Bazoum, a favourite of his predecessor President Issoufou, won the people’s mandate with 56% of the popular votes in 2021.
The coup plotters said they decided to "put an end to the regime that you know due to the deteriorating security situation and bad governance."
What exactly do the mutinous soldiers mean by deteriorating security and bad governance?
Are these reasons sufficient for a set of soldiers to appropriate treason as the means to solve their country’s problems?
Is Tchiani justified to betray his boss? Did he need to betray his boss to save his country?
Most importantly, how did the soldiers measure deteriorating security and bad governance?
Should the destiny of a nation be steered based on the feelings of a few soldiers?
It would be seen that this latest coup in the Niger Republic was influenced more by a combination of palace politics and ethnic factors than the widely-mouthed reasons.
Let’s see.
Deteriorating Security?
While the military junta cited the “continually deteriorating security situation” as a core justification for the coup, ACLED argues that “Niger has statistically fared better than its neighbours in terms of violence and conflict.”
Source: ACLED
“The years of 2019 and 2020, during Issoufou’s reign, were particularly devastating for the Nigerien FDS as they suffered heavy losses due to a series of mass-casualty attacks perpetrated by IS Sahel. In 2021, Niger experienced a record year of conflict coinciding with its first democratic transition when Bazoum succeeded Issoufou.
“Ever since, Niger continues to see high numbers of conflict incidents, although levels of lethal violence are in steady decline, and significantly reduced in comparison to Mali and Burkina Faso”
Bad Governance?
Could the bad governance include President Bazoum’s intention to retire General Tchiani after the latter defended him and his predecessor during attempted coups?
An ACLED overview of the Nigerien situation reads: “While some interpret this event through the context of Russia’s increasing influence or its alignment with Western military training initiatives, the primary catalysts were essentially domestic in nature.
“The leader of the coup, General Abdourahamane Tchiani, was rumored to be on the verge of losing his position as head of the Presidential Guard – a role in which he had defended the regime against numerous attempted coups during the tenures of both former President Mahamadou Issoufou and his successor Bazoum. It is possible that growing discontent within the FDS had intensified over the years under the rule of Issoufou and his successor Bazoum.”
Or could bad governance mean Bazoum’s badmouthing of the mutinous military regimes in neighbouring countries, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Mali, and his own inefficient army?
The ACLED review further notes that Niger was, until recently, France's only ally in the central Sahel, while neighbouring countries had grown increasingly anti-French. President Bazoum's criticism of Mali's partnership with Russia’s Wagner Group and Burkina Faso's self-defence militias has been perceived as patronizing and exacerbating violence.
Additionally, Bazoum's recent comment about militants being stronger than the region's armies may have been considered disrespectful by his soldiers and provided a rallying point for a successful coup this time.
We hope Niger’s security situation improves in the hands of the soldiers, unlike in similar Sahel countries, and governance gets better now with further isolation and sanctions against the military regime.
Fraternité
The first problem is Nigeriens' broken brotherhood within.
The debate over the ethnicity and legitimacy of President Mohamed Bazoum is reported severally to have contributed to Niger’s latest coup. Bazoum is an ethnic Arab minority from Niger’s Diffa region.
Despite winning the election with about 56% of the vote in an election that the runner-up, Mahamane Ousmane, said was marred with fraud, his ethnic background is said to have created tensions within the military establishment, which largely comprises members of other ethnic groups.
Source: Niger Map and Facts: World Atlas
Niger’s national motto, Fraternité, Travail, Progrès, seems to have been compromised with discrimination among ethnic groups in the country.
Source: Wikipedia
An international relations and diplomacy expert teaching at the U.S. International University in Nairobi, Dr. Edgar Githua, speaking on VOA, suggested Bazoum’s ethnicity and lack of popularity as one of the drivers of the Niger coup.
“He’s a Diffa Arab, and he came from a minority group ... he came in and he was making lots of changes because he inherited a country that had bigger ethnic groups ... we are talking about the Hausas, the Zamas, the Tuaregs, ... and normally what happens for such presidents who inherit constituencies where they come from a minority, ... they feel like they are under sieged. ... because ... you are in the minority and the other people who control government are from other ethnic groups who believe or do not feel, you deserve to lead them,”
The BBC also noted that “Gen Tchiani is from the majority Hausa ethnic group, and comes from Tillabéri region, a traditional recruiting ground for the military.” It added that “some analysts have wondered whether the overthrow of Mr Bazoum, who is from the minority Arab community, might open up ethnic tensions in Niger.”
The second problem is Niger’s broken brotherhood with France.
There is growing sentiments among francophone African countries that any government that befriends France could not work in the best interest of its own people. President Bazoum courted France and the West politically and economically, especially in military cooperation.
Niger’s new military rulers, like those in Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Mali, ride on this popular feeling that France has broken the fraternal bond and kindred spirit it shares with the people in its colonies.
In Niger, as in other francophone African countries, french-speaking people are unhappy that France has not lived up to its national motto, Liberté, égalité, fraternité ('liberty, equality, fraternity).
The Francophone countries lag behind, and their people’s poverty-stricken visage does not resemble that of the average Frenchman in France.
Nigeriens are one of the poorest and most deprived people on earth. Yet, France demands common brotherhood (fraternity) from its people without facilitating (and sometimes frustrating) true political liberty and economic equality, as it’s obtainable in France.
In Africa, especially, France sought to transform people in French colonies into black French men and women, often by subordinating the native language, culture and beliefs to France’s.
France has also been accused of subordinating the fiscal and monetary policies of francophone countries through a “colonial currency”, the CFA franc.
Source: the BBC
A BBC fact check of one of these accusations revealed that:
“France does print currency - the CFA franc - for 14 African countries, including Burkina Faso. Participation in this currency is voluntary.
“The currency was created by France in the mid-1940s to serve as legal tender in its then-African colonies.
“France required African countries using the CFA franc to pool 50% of their foreign exchange reserves (not their exports) with two African central banks which then deposited these with the French treasury, in return for a guaranteed exchange rate with the Euro.
“They were free to access these reserves if they wanted to and France paid interest while holding them (at 0.75%).”
Critics of the CFA currency arrangement have called it a relic of colonialism, saying it has impeded economic development for the 14 African countries that are part of it.
They also argue that they (the francophone countries) have no say in deciding monetary policies agreed to by European nations in the Eurozone.
An article for the US-based Brookings Institute last year said that while countries using the CFA franc had generally seen lower inflation, the CFA franc arrangement limits their policy options, particularly in dealing with the impact of the coronavirus pandemic.
“Other economists have pointed out that annual average GDP growth - the increase in the value of all goods and services produced - of CFA countries and other African economies has been fairly comparable over time” - but not comparable with France’s.
Travail
Successful coups as this, and even the unsuccessful ones, frustrate the efforts of Nigeriens at realising a truly stable republic with a representative government.
Niger has experienced a history of political volatility, with past coup attempts and military involvement in politics. This instability may have undermined efforts towards democratic consolidation.
The significant presence of foreign military troops and bases in Niger, especially from the US and France, was a contentious issue for the military leadership. The perception that these foreign forces undermined the national military's authority and role could have contributed to the dissatisfaction within the military ranks.
The foreign military presence also raised concerns about national sovereignty and control over security matters.
Again, despite the presence of foreign forces and military bases, the government was unable to halt the escalating violence, resulting in thousands of deaths and displacements.
The rise in insecurity and ongoing insurgent attacks by groups such as Al-Qaeda, Islamic State affiliates, and Boko Haram created a sense of instability and a perception that the government was unable to effectively address the security challenges.
Yet, the hard work of nurturing a republican spirit, forming representative governments at all levels, and establishing responsible leadership cannot be cancelled by military adventurism time after time simply because one president or the other performed below expectation.
Progrès
Economic stagnation, poor governance, and corruption were contributing factors to Niger’s putsch.
Niger's struggle to capitalize on its significant uranium deposits for socio-economic development, coupled with a low GDP per capita, led to public discontent. The perception of economic mismanagement and lack of progress may have eroded support for the government.
Yet, it’s hard to find progress where republican ideals and inclusion of minorities in the commonwealth are continuously ignored, as is often the case with Niger and its neighbours.
None of the 10 countries that made the furthest developmental progress in the world has a group of men barking commands at their people, as is the case in Africa’s Sahel region.
Source: UNDP; World Population Review
Sadly, all the African countries where soldiers wield guns to settle their grouse with the state, where civilians welcome bullets instead of ballots in correcting wrongs by elected officials, find themselves at the bottom wrung of progress on earth.
Source: UNDP; World Population Review
All 6 countries that still countenance military rule in the Sahel region are among the world’s 10 least developed countries.
Moving forward, the reactions of regional and international actors will play a vital role in shaping the coup's aftermath.
So far, the condemnation and threats of sanctions by ECOWAS and other international stakeholders created a complex geopolitical environment that influenced the junta's decisions and responses.
Where is next after Niger?
It is that African country that has not learnt to deal with ethnic tensions, regional and internal insecurity, economic challenges, political volatility, and internal discontent within the military through patriotic compromise and elite consensus.
Where is next after Niamey?
That African city where people acknowledge guns over knowledge.
And who is next after the Nigerien?
It is that African citizen that jettisons fraternity, hard work, and progress.
Really, Nigeria (state cohesion and security situation) is next to Niger but the Nigerian (civilian and soldier) seems to have moved very far away from the Nigerien state of mind.
Hopefully.
Thank you for reading this Data Dive, and see you next week. Meanwhile, let’s wish that brothers and sisters in Niger Republic, Niger State, Niger Delta, and Nigeria find the path to fraternity, the patience for hard work, and the peace needed to progress.